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THE RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGION AND ETHNIC NATIONALISM
IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
by Morgan Oddie
Morgan E. Oddie is a graduate student at Queens University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.
Ethno-religious political cleavages have come to dominate the climate of modern global
conflicts. Especially evident in the post-Cold War period of international relations, conflicts of
nationalities and ethnic groups divided by historical struggle and parochial allegiances have
replaced the ideological disputes that once dictated global geo-politics. Having disturbed Europe’s
past, nationalism remains a pervasive force, resulting in consistent clashes over disputed territory,
notably in the countries which formerly constituted the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in the Balkan region of South-eastern Europe. Particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, constructed (and
in some instances, imposed) national identities based on religion contributed to conflict over the
country’s independence because of its compositionally diverse ethnic make-up in a generally
linguistically monolithic region. While it may seem that cultural, political, and economic factors
were more prominent than religious roots of conflict, ethno-religious nationalist identities
‘religisized’ politics, and thus portrayed social and political problems in religious terms. Religion
is frequently of intrinsic importance in the development and maintenance of the national identity
as a false absolute, and consequently, may provide sacral justification for acts of aggression,
terrorism, and even genocide that would not normally be sanctified by the religion.
For the purposes of this paper, ethno-nationalism is defined as the situation “in which
proportionately large, regionally concentrated peoples pursue independent statehood or extensive
regional autonomy as their objective.”1 In the quest for self-determination, groups must define
themselves as an actual or imagined community for the purposes of the unity of national
identification. Members of ethnic groups usually see themselves as “natural categories” (as
opposed to constructed) that have always been in existence, with myths of survival and struggle
disseminated through multiple generations.2 Ethnic identities in conflict are often viewed as
kinship relationships between members because of attitudes and traditions of belief towards
biological features and territorial location. The Primordialist theory of ethnic identity supports the
commonly stated “ancient ethnic hatreds” as the rationale for war in the Republic of BosniaHerzegovina (this was used by members of the international community and by perpetrators of
violence). The causes of the war, however, are many and varied, and the aforementioned argument
is essentialist and oversimplifies the complex dynamics and the context which led to the conflict.
This essay, instead, proposes the Constructivism theory of ethnic identity formation, which claims
that ethnicity is the product of social processes rather than a cultural given, that it is made and
remade, and is often chosen depending on circumstances rather than ascribed through birth.
Religion often plays a crucial role in ethnic definition, as many of the quarrelling nationalist
groups are too similar in ethno-linguistic features to be separated by criteria other than religious
affiliation. Religion is thereby utilized in a secondary function as a cultural characterization, rather
than a purely spiritual alignment and religious community. This is especially true in the ethnic
conflict of Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as BiH), with the Orthodox Serbians, Roman
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Catholic Croatians, and Muslim Bosniaks. Bosnia was Yugoslavia’s most ethnically diverse republic
with approximately 44% Muslims, 31% Serbs, and 17% Croats (other minority groups like Jews and
Romas were significantly diminished during World War II Nazi genocidal campaigns).3 Although
Croatian and Serbian aggressors were fronted by local surrogates and Bosnian nationals took part
in ethnic cleansing, it is important to stress that not all ethnic members were aligned with such
policies. For example, approximately one third of Bosnians defending Sarajevo from siege were
Serbian, and the commander of defense for the city was Serbian.4 The ethnic divisions in BiH that
are explored throughout this essay are not homogenous, but it is important to analyze the
relationship between the three larger ethnic communities, each defined by a distinct religious
system as the main cultural distinguishing factor.5 Although the identities cannot be fully
understood with reference only to Islam or Christianity, religion has to be considered instrumental
in the shared history and locality among all of the groups in the specific Bosnian context.6 Prior to
the conflict, there were few areas where any of these communities formed a compact bloc
(particularly in urban areas with high rates of inter-marriage and historically multi-ethnic tolerant),
and all of the communities spoke the same or a similar variant of the Southern Slav language.7
Ethnic composition was often not identifiably varied enough within the three groups to be
definable in a manner other than religious affiliation (particularly with Bosniaks); subsequently
fostering competing nationalist identities which attempt to coincide with the historic conflict of
religious traditions. Victims in the systematic ethnic cleansing campaigns were mostly selected on
the basis of their religion, a highly problematic characterization in some cases. When the target
population had an identity that was not apparent from personal names; informants or public
records (e.g. voter registration lists) were needed to select victims for persecution.8
Prior to the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter referred
to as Yugoslavia) and subsequent nationalist conflicts, the designation of Bosnian “Muslims” was
primarily a cultural and not a religious one.9 As ethnicity was becoming more central in politics,
Muslim national identity became officially recognized for those who did not identify as Serbs or
Croats, but constituted the ethnic majority in BiH.10 The category of “Muslim” was created to offer
nationhood to the group of Bosniaks and Slavic Muslims that would be comparable to that of the
Croats and Serbs in Bosnia, but the term led to the contradictions of identity that remained
unexplored in the duration of the ethnic cleansing. For instance, a non-observant or even atheist
Bosniak with a Muslim name was considered to be a member of the “Muslim nation,” while an
observant Albanian Muslim was designated as a minority “Albanian” with no reflection of religion
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in the designated11 name of the nationality.12 Disconnect between religion and ethnic identification
may be due in part to the restrictions on the expression of religion under communist regimes,13 as
religion was considered the antithesis to “Brotherhood and Unity”.14 So, after forty-five years of
communist Yugoslavia, it is unsurprising that religion played little role (at least in the public) lives
of the three ethnic groups even though they all had their origins in religion.15 The role of religion
in the Bosnian war has paradoxically been both obvious and invisible, with its victims and
organizers identified by their religious tradition, while religious manifestations are simultaneously
viewed as masks for deeper social, economic, and political problems.16
The destruction of the Berlin Wall symbolically represented the finality of the failure of the
Soviet communist experiment, and communist ideology began to be superseded by nationalist
movements that led to declarations of independence of many former communist nations.
Yugoslavia began to face difficulties prior to the dissolution of European communism, commencing
with the death of the charismatic revolutionary leader Marshal Josip Broz Tito. The issue of
religious-ethno nationalism was suppressed and Serbian hegemonic aspirations were undermined
through Tito’s commitment to recognize separate state sovereignty and self-determination of the
various Yugoslav ethnicities in a federal system.17 Marxism provided the unifying ideology under
Yugoslav “Brotherhood and Unity” that attempted to eliminate ethno-religious nationalist
sentiments that would result in separate communities. No popular leader emerged who was
powerful enough to replace Tito, and the economy faced severe problems under the burden of
accumulated massive foreign debt and widespread mismanagement of major industries, which led
to increased unemployment and the deterioration of the standard of living to which the Yugoslav
population had grown accustomed.18 Ethnic-based politics were discouraged and repressed under
Tito’s regime (along with religion under communism), but the instability and insecurity of the
country fostered the emergence of ruthless and nationalistic leaders like Slobodan Miloševiæ in
Serbia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia (there were electoral victories of nationalist parties in most
of the republics in 1990). Miloševiæ quickly took control of the secret policy, while Tudjman passed
laws that were openly discriminatory against the Serbian minority of Croatia. Both took control of
public media for the dissemination of effective propaganda that aggravated fears and tensions
between Croats and Serbs (including frequent mention of Croatian allegiance with Hitler’s Nazi
regime).19 Propaganda out of both Zagreb and Belgrade demonized Muslims and claimed that the
Bosniak ethnic party Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA) desired an Islamic republic20 in BiH that
11

This exemplifies the importance of how ethnicity is ascribed by others in addition to self-identification.
Albanian Muslims would self-identify as part of the worldwide community of the Islamic Ummah, but are deemed separate
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would persecute non-Muslims.21
Prior to the secession of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1991, all of the Bosnian
political parties (except the radical separatist wing of the Croatian nationalist party Hrvatska
demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine22) opposed separation from Yugoslavia, but were against
the Serbian campaign for a stronger Yugoslav federation (i.e. constitutional changes that allocated
greater federal government powers) instrumental as a Greater Serbia.23 War in Croatia established
patterns of ethnic cleansing, spawned some of the paramilitary units that engaged in conflict in
BiH, and Croat atrocities were utilized by Serb propagandists to create fears among Bosnian Serbs
that the violence would be repeated if BiH became independent.24 In 1992, one day after the Bosnian
referendum for independence, Serb forces erected barricades across the Sarajevo capital and the city
came under siege, from which citizens suffered innumerable artillery attacks, sniping from the
surrounding hills, deprivation of food, water, electricity, heating oil, and other necessities.
The culmination of the systematic ethnic cleansing was the 1995 Srebrenica Massacre of
approximately eight thousand Muslim men and boys by Serb forces. Srebrenica has become
synonymous with the worst post-World War II atrocity in Europe, but one cannot fully understand
the war or specific events within the war, if one ignores the role that perceptions of the past played
in victim and perpetrator interpretations of events. Nationalist myths and collective memories of
distant historical events coincided with the living memories of more recent events. The massacres
carried out by the Ustaše against Serbs in World War II and the Muslim attacks on Serb villages
around Srebrenica in 1992 and 1993 were interpreted within a larger historical framework,
however, the distant historical allusions were more common in order to explain and justify
actions.25 For example, General Ratko Mladiæ (one of the most important war criminals indicted for
genocide sought by the Hague Tribunal until he was detained in May 2011) made references to the
Battle of Kosovo26 (1389) prior to commencing the attack on Srebrenica, and presented the take-over
of the town as revenge for the defeat suffered by Turkish hands during the first Serbian Uprising
(1804-1813).27 He was quoted as saying,
“Here we are in Srebrenica on July 11, 1995. On the eve of yet another great
Serbian holiday, we present this city to the Serbian people as a gift. Finally, after
the rebellion against the Dahije [local Turk janissary leaders], the time has come to

BiH, and the country did not fit the criteria of his description (i.e. he claimed that the Islamic utopia could only be
successful in a primarily Muslim country – a claim that supported Croat and Serb propaganda of non-Muslim persecution
and potential genocide).
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Greater Serbia was the product of nationalist ideology that proposed the union of all Serbs in one state, reuniting the
territory of the 14th century Serbian Empire that existed prior to Ottoman invasions.
24
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25
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Bosnia,” in The New Bosnian Mosaic: Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society, ed. Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms and
Ger Duijzings (Burlington, VT, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007), p.143.
26
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to take full control of the region.
27
Ibid, p.142.
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take revenge on the Turks of the region.”28
The collective memory and trauma of the massacre has had a lasting impact on the Bosniak
community in terms of closer religious affiliation and in some instances, reluctance to commit to
the reconciliation process.
Atrocities were committed by all parties involved in the conflicts, first with Serbian-led and
Croatian-led ethnic cleansings, and then, with the subsequent retribution taken by Muslims after
the civil war. It is a mistake, however, to regard the clashes within the framework of the Christian
West defending against the onslaught of religious fundamentalism in the East. This conception
aligns with Edward Said’s Orientalism and the denigration of non-Western cultures through
perpetuated stereotypes (see Said, 1978), particularly by the media covering the BiH conflict, but
also by perpetrators. For example, Tudjman became notorious for his extreme nationalism as
manifested in his crude vision of Croatia as the bolster and fortification for Europe against the
barbaric forces of the East – primarily Islam, and to a lesser extent, Orthodox Christianity.29 The
lagging intervention of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
which finally occurred mostly through air strike bombing campaigns, has frequently been seen as
the triumphing of the developed West over lawlessness commonly found in Eastern countries.
Some Bosniak Muslims believed that the extended period of war lacking international intervention
was due to religious divides, one religious leader reported that, “Europe wouldn’t remain
uninvolved if Christians were being attacked and destroyed in the same way.”30 There were also
many Muslims from the international community who encouraged solidarity of political Islam, or
nationalist Muslim lobby groups to pressure European governments to intervene in the conflict.
The genocide31 is often cited as having resulted in a widespread Islamic revival among the
population, which is still evident today. Although some argue that there was a process of
‘Islamicization’ before the war with co-operation in the Non-Aligned Movement and with oil
producing countries of the Middle East, there has been a notable increase in open religious
allegiance in the post-war period.32 Since the massacre, an increasing number of mosques and
madrasas (Islamic schools) have been built, including the multi-million dollar King Fahd complex.
The issue of religion in education and the visibility of religious symbols in the military have been
particularly contentious because of the potential for marginalization of secular Muslims and threat
to reconciliation process with Serbs and Croats.33 Although outward signs of religious devotion
were virtually unseen prior to the ethnic wars, public displays of religious symbolism, for example
men and women in full religious dress, are now very common. Historical connections of Islam in
Bosnia date back to the fifteenth century with the conquest by the Ottoman Empire, but despite the
extensive history, Bosniaks were described as having “moderate Islam” prior to the modern
conflicts, where religious devotion was private and adherence to mandates like wajib salat (the
obligatory aspects of daily prayer as a pillar of Islamic practice and worship) was relatively
liberal.34 Even with the relatively secular nature of Bosniak Muslim life, many in the global Ummah
28
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interpreted their Muslim identity in terms of the larger connection with the religious community.
The hesitation of the international community for intervention may have resulted in more Islamic
extremists who began volunteering to fight in BiH, and some Islamic states (particularly Iran)
provided arms and advisors.35 As the war proceeded, some Muslims began to embrace the idea of
an Islamic nation-state, and there was a declining tolerance seen among some religious leaders.36
Dr. Mustafa Ceriæ, the Grand Mufti (reis-ul-ulema) of BiH, has on occasion publicly suggested that
all Serbs share the blame for what the Serb separatists perpetrated, and later in the war found an
audience for his circulated religious magazines and newspapers, from which he began a campaign
against mixed marriages.37
Aside from the role religion played in the victimization of Bosnian wars, it also played an
additional role in the motivation and justification of violence tied to the ethno-nationalism of the
perpetrators. There is a common thread in religious violence: perpetrators possess worldviews that
justified to themselves the need for brutality to defend their faiths and have committed beliefs that
what they are doing will result in a radically new social and political order.38 Theories such as jus
ad bellum, or just war, allow ambiguity in interpretative measures taken by religious adherents. The
criteria lacks a strict ethical framework, and requires only a just cause, proper authority, right
intentions, reasonable chance of success, proportionality, and it must be a last resort. Relativism is
easily engaged by any religion within the ambiguous structure, thereby justifying any war
sanctioned by religious adherents. Although mainstream denominations have isolated the religious
nationalism and violent acts as “untrue” religion, the acts of the Croat and Serb nationalists were
based on religiously informed ideologies and constructions of differences by Catholic and
Orthodox Christian nationalists. With strong nationalist personalities, like Croatian President
Franjo Tudjman, the role of the Catholic Church in the ethnic cleansing has been less
acknowledged,39 but religious acts of violence were sanitized by virtue of their part in a religious
template of myth and history.40 Croat Catholic nationalism was centred upon the public campaign
for the canonization of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, who was held in high esteem by Catholic Croat
nationalists for his opposition to the Yugoslav communist regime’s attempt to control the church.
His persecution made him a hero to the Croats, but he was loathed by Serbs and Serbian clergy for
his suspected support of the Croatian Nazi puppet government in World War II, and his failure to
take a strong public stance in defense of those persecuted at the hands of the regime, including
Serbs, Jews, and others.41
Growing concerns about the rapid growth of Muslim minorities in the Balkans culminated
in the 1980s with the increasing decentralization of society, when Serbian elites were confronted
with post-communist democracy and fears of the Balkans acting as a frontier for Muslim
penetration into Europe to realise fundamentalist aspirations of global rule.42 Serbian nationalism
in Bosnia was catalyzed by the perception of the threat posed to Serbian community and cultural
heritage by the Muslim Albanians in Kosovo, in particular. Unrealized fears and pre-emptive
35
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striking motivated the subsequent actions taken against Muslim Bosniaks, including the heinous
war crimes. The Serbian instances of religiously motivated nationalism were much more overt than
the Croats. The Orthodox Christian Church openly supported the acts of aggression against the
others, and soldiers were even blessed before and after their atrocities by Serbian clergy with
emphasis on referencing Hrebelijanoviæ Lazar, a fourteenth century Serbian prince and martyr of
the Church.43 There were, however, public statements made by Orthodox clergy decrying the
violence of the war and calling for increased policing, while the Serbian Orthodox Church was
simultaneously denying large-scale violence and organized rapes, and claimed their own
victimization though Croat genocidal initiatives, and publically and privately promoted expulsion
of Muslims from their homes.44 The Orthodox clergy now rejects all accusations that the Church
actively caused or supported the Bosnian War, despite well documented facts.45
Shrines, mosques and Muslim-identified structures, including the Aladza mosque, widely
considered the jewel of Balkan Islamic architecture, were destroyed during the ransacking of cities.
The systematic destruction of the institutions of cultural monuments has been proposed as
circumstantial evidence of the Serbian desire to destroy Bosniak Muslims as an ethnic group
(referring to genocidal intent as defined by ICTY).46 During reconstruction efforts, many Muslims
were attacked and beaten by the Serbs, and politically, the legitimacy of the initial structure was
often questioned (i.e. if it should not have existed in the first place, there is no need to rebuild it
now that it has been destroyed). After nationalists cleansed a town, all of the streets would be
renamed after heroes from Serbian national mythology, and soldiers would receive medals in the
name of those heroes.47 Although the Serbian government made an official apology for the 1995
Srebrenica Massacre, voting patterns show that the population is still polarized in its opinions
about its wartime past and the atrocities committed, largely due to the remaining nationalism in
a large portion of Serbs.48 When the most important Serbian institutions like the government and
Orthodox Church deny or qualify the genocide, it sends a message that confirms the image of civicminded people as traitors to the nation.49 Peace-building and reconciliation efforts have been
further challenged with the appearance of an increasing number of extreme nationalist and neoNazi youth groups who have appropriated the powerful symbolic apparatus of Serbia’s violent
nationalism in the 1990s to lend credibility to their claim of being bearers of true patriotic values.5051
The division of conflict termination has two distinct parts: stopping the killing by putting
down weapons and separating forces; and, making peace by removing the incentive for reengaging
in war by changing the critical perception that the war could resume.52 The first part of the conflict
43
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cessation was accomplished through the Dayton Accord which created a transitionary government
and partitioned the BiH into two territories (both measures were meant to be temporary, but are
still in effect). Some have argued that the separation essentially created a homogenous Serbian
entity in the Republika Srpska, which was one of the main goals of the Serbian forces.53 Regardless
of the effects, the Dayton Accord effectively ended the physical war. Unfortunately, because of its
effects, it negatively contributed to the conflict resolution and peace-building process by
legitimizing ethno-national separation and guiding post-war discourse based on this premise.54
Religion has played a crucial role in the formation of nationalist identity, and has provided
justification for many heinous acts committed by all parties. Frequently, official representatives of
religious institutions portray their own group as the main victims of war, and neglect to discuss
or question the culpability of responsible parties from their group, which has been detrimental to
peace and reconciliation.55 Although the aforementioned instances of nationalism are still
exceptionally prevalent in BiH (and most of the other former republics in the Yugoslav federation),
there are religious leaders and theologians engaging in analysis and dialogue in attempts to
reconcile the divided communities. Supported by international dialogue and conflict management,
inter-religious and political negotiations are trying to resolve issues caused by the nationalist divide
that has made cohabitation in BiH virtually impossible.56 During the 1990s, there were meetings
between the heads of religious communities in the former Yugoslavia, and an Interreligious
Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina was created with the help of American Ambassador Swanee Hunt
after the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord.57 With the increased capacity for ecumenical cooperation,
Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox leaders were able to condemn the violations of human rights and
appeal to the international community with a united front. Many of the denunciations of the war
by united community leaders have acknowledged that religious fears and symbols have been
manipulated and abused by ultranationalists for their own ends, but have downplayed the role of
religious differences or religious nationalism in fomenting the conflict.58 By moving away from
inflexible dogma and liturgical formalism, multi-religious communities may harmoniously work
towards greater peace, but reconciliation needs a willingness to forgive and to ask forgiveness as
a basic precondition for permanent peaceful coexistence from all parties.59
The legacy of the Bosnian War was the precision with which the target ethno-religious
group was sought out and systematically destroyed. It is clear that the nationalist identities that
developed in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the post-Tito period of Yugoslavia were greatly influenced
by historical religious affiliation. Although religion was not a pervasive force in pre-war everyday
life, it aided the construction and maintenance of exclusive national identities. Religion and ancient
ethnic hatreds were not the primary causes of the conflict, as this is an over-simplification of
complex historical, economic, political, and social causes. In order for there to be long-lasting peace
and reconciliation in the region, there must be dialogue between the conflicting parties, and
religious leaders need to aid in the facilitation of community transition in the case of settlement.
If there remains to be a preoccupation with identity and difference, Bosnia and all of the Balkan
states will be unable to repair the fragmented concepts of identity by unmasking the false
53
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perception of primordial identity universalism. The gulf between the ethno-religious communities
cannot be overcome solely by force, but needs to be bridged based on post-nationalist efforts that
encourage the reintegration of multi-ethnic tolerance that was once characteristic of the region.
Optimistically, the future of the Balkan communities will consist of unity for the achievement of
the common desire of all of the states to be integrated into the European Union. Local and
international efforts for the goal will be aided by the support of each of the religious traditions
together.
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